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This paper investigates how IT-enabled monitoring systems mitigate moral hazard in an online 
labor market and their effect on market competition.  We exploit a quasi-experiment at 
Freelancer when it introduced enhanced offline tracking features in 2015.  Using a large dataset 
including 17,827 fixed-price projects and 8,563 hourly projects, we use a difference-in-
differences (DID) approach to identify the treatment effect of the implementation of IT-enabled 
monitoring systems on employer contractor choice, employer surplus and market competition. 
We found that the IT-enabled monitoring system lowers the employers’ preference for high-
reputable bidders, and thus reduces the reputation premiums. Meanwhile, comparing the trend 
of fixed-price projects, the implementation of the monitoring systems increased the number of 
bids by 17.4% and increased employer surplus in hourly projects by 21.5%. Our result suggests 
that IT-enabled monitoring systems have a significant effect on alleviating moral hazards, 
reducing agency costs, and facilitating market competition. 
Keywords:  monitoring systems, moral hazard problems, reputation systems, online labor 
market, market competition, IT policy and management, contract choice 
 
Introduction 
Information technology has a profound effect on firm boundaries (Bresnahan, et al. 2002; Dewan and 
Ren 2011; Hitt 1999).  As IT reduces transaction costs, firms increasingly resort to market mechanisms 
such as outsourcing and offshoring for service procurement.  Online labor markets are at the forefront of 
this phenomenon. In the past few decades, online labor markets have undergone a tremendous growth. 
For example, by December 2015, there were over 9 million projects posted in Freelancer, one of the most 
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prominent online labor markets, and about 17 million registered users have used the platform to look for 
job opportunities1.  
Despite the tremendous growth, online labor markets have their limitations due to information 
asymmetry and agency problems between contractors and employers, amplified by spatial and temporal 
separations (Hong and Pavlou 2014; Horton 2015). Unlike the traditional temporary employment, 
monitoring and control mechanisms to ensure work performance (Srivastava and Teo 2012) are weaker 
and indirect in online labor markets (Horton et al. 2015). Therefore, it’s easier for opportunistic 
contractors to shirk and misrepresent their effort. A common solution to this agency problem is the use of 
fixed-price contracts, where compensation is outcome-driven. That is, contractors get a fixed payment 
only when they complete the projects successfully (Mani et al. 2012).  Consequently, the dominant 
strategy for contractors is to complete the projects, which mitigates the moral hazard problems (Fama 
1991).  
An alternative to fixed-price contracts in online labor markets is hourly contracts, where compensation is 
determined based on the amount of hours the contractors have spent and the hourly wages set in the 
contracts (Mani et al. 2012). While hourly contracts provide a stronger incentive for better project 
performance (Mani et al. 2012) and have better applicability to complex projects (Bajari and Tadelis 2001;  
Dey et al. 2010) , they also offer the contractors monetary incentives to shirk by over-reporting work 
hours or lowering their effort levels2. Therefore, asymmetric information in online labor markets renders 
moral hazard problems of hourly projects more prominent (Bajari and Tadelis 2001).  
To alleviate moral hazard issues in online labor markets, many online labor platforms started to provide 
online tracking functionality (Agrawal et al. 2013). For instance, Freelancer released an enhanced tracking 
feature in its application since August 2nd, 2015.  In this study, we analyze how such IT-enabled 
monitoring tools would influence employers’ and contractors’ behavior in online labor markets. In 
particular, we address three research questions: First, do IT-enabled monitoring systems help alleviate 
moral hazard problems, and thus lower employers’ preference for bidders with high-reputation? Second, 
if IT-enabled monitoring systems indeed change employer preference, how does such a change influence 
the competition between contractors? Third, given its impact on the market competition, how do IT-
enabled monitoring systems affect employer surplus? 
We propose a number of hypotheses based on the agency theory and we expect IT-enabled monitoring 
systems to have a significant effect on alleviating the moral hazard problems in hourly contracts relative 
to fixed-price contracts. We treat the contractors’ bidding and employers’ contract rewarding decisions as 
revealed preferences and analyze how the enhanced monitoring feature affect both the demand and the 
supply sides of the hourly project market. Our econometric identification hinges on a quasi-natural 
experiment (release of enhanced offline tracking feature in the Freelancer application), in which we 
consider hourly projects as the treatment group and fixed-price projects as the control group. With a large 
dataset including 26,390 projects posted on Freelancer, we use a difference-in-differences (DID) 
approach to identify the treatment effect of the feature change on employer contract decision, employer 
surplus, and market competition.  Our analysis suggests that after the introduction of the enhanced offline 
tracking features, employers have less preference for bidders with high-reputation, and thus be less 
willing to pay the reputation premiums. Further, taking fixed-price projects as the control group, the 
treatment fosters market competition for hourly projects by increasing the number of bids on hourly 
contracts by 17.4% and increases the employer surplus in hourly projects by 21.5%. 
Our paper makes three key contributions. First, our paper is the first large-scale empirical research to 
investigate the effect of IT-enabled monitoring systems on employer and contractor choices in online 
labor markets, which extends prior research on the contract design in labor markets (Chen and Bharadwaj 
2009; Clemons and Chen 2011; Fama 1991).  Second, this paper contributes to research on reputation 
systems in online platforms. While previous literature focused on the effect of reputation system on 
agency problems (Dellarocas 2006; Gopal and Koka 2010; Horton and Golden 2015). Our paper 
investigated the effect of monitoring systems and its interaction with reputation systems. Specifically, our 
study showed that there exists a partial substitution relationship between reputation systems and IT-
                                                             
1 https://www.freelancer.com/about 
2 http://blog.freelancersunion.org/2014/05/13/hourly-rate-or-project-fee-what-makes-freelancers-more-money/ 
 IT-enabled Monitoring Systems in Online Labor Markets 
  
 Thirty Seventh International Conference on Information Systems, Dublin 2016 3 
enabled monitoring systems.  Third, numerous studies have attested to the positive role of reputation 
systems, however, the unintended consequence of reputation systems is that they increase entry barrier 
for inexperienced contractors who have not established a reputation (Pallais 2014), which is yet to receive 
research attention. Our study suggests that monitoring systems serve to lower the entry barrier for 
inexperienced contractors and help to address the “cold-start” problem at online labor markets (Pallais 
2014) and provides valuable practical implications. Finally, this study extends our understanding of the 
design of online labor markets (Hong et al. 2016, Horton 2015), specifically, we extend the understanding 
of designing IT-enabled monitoring systems to alleviate moral hazard problems, reduce agency costs, and 
facilitate competition in online labor markets. 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical background followed by the 
hypotheses development section. In the empirical analysis part, the data description and empirical models 
are presented. Finally, we discussed the overall findings, implications, and limitations.  
Theoretical Background  
Online Labor Market 
Online labor markets facilitate the procurement of labor services from all over the world (Hong and 
Pavlou 2014) by matching employers with contractors (Zheng et al. 2015). During recent years, online 
labor markets have grown so dramatically that as much as around 25 percentages of workers in the US are 
hired through online work projects3. Because of spatial and temporal separations between employers and 
contractors, information asymmetry persists in such markets, as contractors’ qualities and their actual 
effort levels are difficult to observe. Therefore, agency problems are prevalent in online labor markets.  
One type of agency problems that has attracted attention from both the practice and academic scholars is 
the adverse selection problem. Adverse selection problems are driven by the asymmetric distribution of 
information and the difficulties in evaluating the contractors’ abilities and skills (Eisenhardt 1989; Horton 
2015). In order to address the adverse selection problems, most online labor markets provided the 
reputation history of contractors by tracking their previous project performance. There is a stream of 
research investigating the effect of reputation system on alleviating the adverse selection problems and 
employers’ awarding decisions. First, good reputation increases the probability of being awarded. When 
the contractors are entry-level, the evaluation information posted by previous employers or the platform 
can significantly help them to get better employment, ceteris paribus (Pallais 2014). Additionally, since 
the technologies are correlated, the previous ratings in related tasks can also indicate contractors’ 
category-specific quality in other similar projects (Kokkodis and Ipeirotis 2015). Moreover, owing to the 
good reputation (comments or ratings), contractors can obtain price premiums, get more employment, 
and have less intention to exit the platform (Moreno and Terwiesch 2014). However, based on an adverse-
selection model, Horton found that information driven from public feedbacks tends to inflate because of 
the bilateral public rating platform design (Horton et al. 2015). Apart from ratings and reviews 
information, the third-party certification is also one of the optional signaling mechanisms (Goes and Lin 
2012). In summary, extant literature suggests that the reputation system and third-party certification 
system help to address the adverse selection problem. 
Once the contractors are awarded, another type of agency problems, the moral hazard problem follows. 
Moral hazard problems refer to the situation when the contractor has no intention to maximize the 
employer’s utility and opportunistically lowers his or her effort level (Eisenhardt 1989). Such shirking 
problems are caused by the unobservability of the contractor’s actual effort level and the misalignment 
between the employer’s and contractor’s interests. Online labor markets are prime examples of markets 
that are subject to the moral hazard problems due to the spatial and temporal separation of the employers 
(principals) and contractors (agents) and lack of effective monitoring systems. However, no prior research 
has examined how the reputation systems and monitoring systems interact to address the moral hazard 
problems and subsequently influence employers’ and contractors’ behaviors. 
                                                             
3http://www.forbes.com/sites/groupthink/2014/10/21/the-next-big-thing-in-e-commerce-online-labor-
marketplaces/#5f62eb9c6117 
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Contract Choice 
In the practice of outsourcing, there are two prevalent contract types, namely, fixed-price contracts and 
time and materials contracts (Banerjee and Duflo 2000). Fixed-price contracts are outcome-driven, and 
the agent gets a fixed payment according to the billing cycle and the amount of output (Mani et al. 2012). 
On the other hand, time and materials contracts, also named as cost-plus contracts, require that the 
payment should be calculated based on the agent’s effort and time in the work process (Mani et al. 2012). 
From the perspective of transaction cost economics, the decision of construal structure depends on the 
tradeoff between potential renegotiation costs of fixed-price contracts and the cost-efficiency losses of 
time and materials contracts (Susarla and Krishnan 2014). According to the extant literature, many 
factors influence the contract choice, such as firm size (Gopal and Sivaramakrishnan 2008), age of firm, 
trust, reputation (Banerjee and Duflo 2000), task complexity, risk of project (Gopal and 
Sivaramakrishnan 2008), previous collaboration experience, business familiarity (Gefen et al. 2008), and 
to what extent outcome is sensitive to the agent’s or the principal’s efforts (Roels et al. 2010). Compared 
to time and materials contracts, fixed-price contracts have higher ex-ante costs to collect information and 
to negotiate the provision, plus higher ex-post maladaptation costs and renegotiation costs (Susarla et al. 
2009). However, time and materials contracts usually entail higher ex-post monitoring and auditing costs 
(Bajari and Tadelis 2001; Dey et al. 2010; Susarla et al. 2009; Susarla and Krishnan 2014).  
Some researchers consider the trade-off between two types of contracts as a “make-or-buy” decision 
(Bajari and Tadelis 2001). The “buy” choice, corresponding to the fixed-price contract, means the external 
contractor takes all the production costs. Therefore, such a choice is preferred when the task is easy to 
define. And the “make” choice, corresponding to the time and material contract, indicates that the 
employer bear all the production costs. Therefore, it is similar to the process of self-production. On the 
incentive side, for the “buy” choice, contractors are contracted for the final outcome of the projects, which 
provides sufficient motivations for them to spend effort and time on the projects with efficiency. Thus, the 
moral hazard problems in the “buy” choice are usually less severe (Fama 1991). However, for a “make” 
choice, contractors’ payments are based on the amount of time they have spent on the projects. Without 
an effective monitoring system, contractors might engage in the opportunistic “shirking” behavior, 
especially when their efforts could not be precisely monitored. Therefore, the moral hazard problems 
usually are more severe than in the “buy” choice. Meanwhile, a “make” choice could have better 
performance and higher client validation quality than the other if the monitoring and auditing process is 
effective and efficient (Dey et al. 2010).  Apart from these two contract types, there are other optional 
contract types, including performance-based contracts, profit-sharing contracts (Dey et al. 2010), and 
hybrid contracts (Banerjee and Duflo 2000). Our paper focuses on the comparison between the fixed-
price and time and materials contracts as these are the only two contract type options in most online labor 
markets (e.g., Freelancer and Upwork).  
Monitoring and Reputation 
Both the monitoring system and the reputation system could be effective mechanisms to alleviate moral 
hazard problems. Monitoring is a mean of lowering the information asymmetry by collecting more 
information on the actions of contractors. Reputation serves as a signal of contractors’ future performance 
based on their performance ratings evaluated by previous employers (Banker and Hwang 2008). Most of 
the previous literature suggests that both the monitoring system and the reputation system can 
independently mitigate moral hazard problems (Drago 1991; Duflo et al. 2012; Hubbard 2000; Pierce et 
al. 2015). 
On the one hand, monitoring transforms the individual information about contractors’ actual effort into 
information that the principals could observe. Therefore, it can lower the probability of “shirking” going 
unnoticed, and thus increase the contractors’ effort (Drago 1991). There is a large body of research 
supporting that, more monitoring increases the contractors’ effort and leads to better performance (Duflo 
et al. 2012; Hubbard 2000; Pierce et al. 2015). On the other hand, reputation links contractors’ 
performance in the present project with the probability of getting hired in the future. Therefore, 
reputation acts as a stimulus to motivate contractors to spend more effort (Horton and Golden 2015). In 
order to avoid getting a bad reputation, the contractor will be less likely to shirk, which implies that 
reputation system plays a role as a sanctioning mechanism (Dellarocas 2006). However, the monitoring 
system and the reputation system might not work independently, which implies that there might be some 
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unexpected interaction relationship between both mechanisms (Demiroglu and James 2010; Diamond 
1991). Because both a well-designed reputation system and a precise monitoring system are effective tools 
to mitigate moral hazard, the introduction of the IT-enabled monitoring system might lower the 
employers’ reliance on the reputation system, and thus weaken the effect of the reputation system. 
Therefore, we expect that the monitoring system might partially substitute for the reputation system in 
reducing contractors’ shirking behavior. However, none of the previous IS studies has investigated the 
interaction relationship between the monitoring system and the reputation system. To sum up, both the 
monitoring system and the reputation system help to alleviate moral hazard (Dellarocas 2006; Duflo et al. 
2012; Horton and Golden 2015; Hubbard 2000; Pierce et al. 2015), but it’s still unclear whether they 
substitute for each other in online labor markets. 
Hypotheses Development 
Substitution between Monitoring and Reputation 
When the risk of moral hazard is high, the employer prefers to choose the contractor with high-
reputation, because the reviews and feedbacks from previous employers help to alleviate information 
asymmetry and serves as a signal of contractor’s average effort level (Banker and Hwang 2008). However, 
when the IT-enabled monitoring system is available, the function of the reputation system might be 
partially substituted by the monitoring system because monitoring system can lower the need for 
reputation signals in term of contractors’ effort and cost uncertainty. First, because of the asymmetric 
information about the contractors’ effort, employers regard the contractors’ reputation as the signals to 
identify the types of contractors (Kokkodis and Ipeirotis 2015). For example, from the perspective of 
employers, a contractor with high-reputation usually be thought as an agent with high effort, which 
implies employers’ preference for contractors with high-reputation (Pallais 2014). However, when the IT-
enabled monitoring tool is available, the employers can verify the contractors’ actual levels of effort and 
only continue the employment if they find that the contractors’ levels of effort are acceptable. Therefore, 
by using an efficient monitoring system, the employers don’t need to emphasize contractors’ reputation 
too much because they have the capability to ensure the awarded contractor’s actual effort (Gopal and 
Koka 2010). Second, monitoring provides better information about the contractors’ performance and how 
to improve it, so that it can help to save time and decrease the cost uncertainty. Before the IT-enabled 
monitoring tool is introduced, the employers might prefer for contractors with high-reputation not only 
because of their higher expected effort but also because of the smaller cost uncertainty (variance) (Mani et 
al. 2012).  However, with the help of the IT-enabled monitoring system, employers can have better 
information about contractors’ performance and instruct them to perform more efficiently. Therefore, no 
matter the contractors have high-reputation or not, the employers can keep the cost uncertainty at a low 
level by ensuring that contractors are making satisfactory progress. This improvement suggests that the 
monitoring system reduces the difference between contractors with high-reputation and those with low-
reputation in terms of cost uncertainty. All in all, the monitoring systems lower employers’ worries in 
contractors’ shirking behavior and high cost uncertainty, and thus substitute for the signal effect of the 
reputation systems. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis and employ a revealed-preference-
based empirical framework to test it:  
H1: After IT-enabled monitoring tool is available, employers of hourly projects will place a less emphasis 
on worker reputation. 
Monitoring and Employer Surplus 
In the same vein, because of the partial substitution effect between monitoring systems and reputation, 
employers will be less willing to pay the price premiums, especially the reputation premiums. From the 
perspective of the supply side (contractors), reputational contractors tend to milk their reputation by 
charging the price premiums (Moreno and Terwiesch 2014). However, such price premiums don’t 
guarantee the higher product quality (Jin and Kato 2006). In such cases, reputation helps to foster 
product differentiation of reputable contractors’ service. Meanwhile, from the perspective of the demand 
side, because of the potential moral hazard problems in the online labor markets, employers are uncertain 
about the effort level of contractors without the monitoring system. Therefore, employers would pay a 
price premium to the high-reputation contractors (Fombrun 1996) and even consider the reputation 
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premiums as the cost of overcoming moral hazard (Esfahani 1991). However, since the monitoring system 
can alleviate the moral hazard problems and partially substitutes for reputation, there is no need for 
employers of hourly projects to pay such reputation premiums to address moral hazard problems. 
Moreover, our argument is also supported by Allgulin and Ellingsen’s (2002) finding that when the 
monitoring system is very precise, efficient and cheap, the agent’s utility reaches its minimum level and 
they become less capable of earning rents. When the agent can be monitored perfectly, any effort level can 
only be paid at his corresponding reservation wage (Allgulin et al. 2002). This argument is also supported 
by the Efficiency Wage Model, which predicts that more intense monitoring leads to lower wage 
premiums (Ewing and Payne 1999; Leonard 1987; Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984). Since employers no longer 
need to pay the reputation premiums to overcome moral hazard, we expect that the employer surplus will 
be higher after a platform implements a monitoring system. So we propose the following hypotheses: 
H2a: After IT-enabled monitoring tool is available, employers of hourly projects will tend to pay a lower 
price premium4. 
H2b: After IT-enabled monitoring tool is available, employers of hourly projects will enjoy a higher 
surplus. 
Monitoring and Competition 
Now considering the effect of IT-enabled monitoring systems on the supply side, we expect that more 
contractors will be interested in hourly projects because of the lower entry barrier, as the reputable 
contractor’s past reputation on work efforts becomes substitutable. On one hand, the monitoring system 
lowers the entry barrier by decreasing the need for reputation to mitigate moral hazard problems. Before 
the monitoring system is available, the reputation acts as an entry barrier for relatively new contractors 
who have not yet built their reputation on the platform. Consequently, those contractors with good 
reputation posted by the employers can obtain better employment with a higher rent (Pallais 2014). 
However, after the release of IT-enabled monitoring systems, employers can obtain direct information 
about contractors’ effort from the real track records instead of past performance, which implies the 
barrier of entry based on reputation prominently drops (Demiroglu and James 2010). Therefore, 
inexperienced contractors are more likely to bid for those hourly projects. On the other hand, based on the 
logic of partial substitution relationship between the monitoring system and reputation we explained 
earlier, and the subsequent change in employers’ preferences, the difference between contractors with 
little platform experience and experienced contractors is dramatically narrowed. Hence, the additional 
value due to high-reputation will be greatly removed, and low-reputational contractors’ work will serve as 
a closer substitute for high-reputable contractors’ work. In such case, the price elasticity of demand will 
rise and the market will become more competitive. On the whole, we expect that the monitoring system 
facilitates competition, and more contractors will enter the more competitive market. Therefore, we 
formalize the next hypothesis as follows: 
H3: After IT-enabled monitoring tool is available, the number of bidders of hourly projects will be higher. 
Research Methodology 
Date Source 
Our data is collected from www.freelancer.com (Freelancer), which is one of the largest online labor 
market platforms. This year, it was awarded as 2015 Best Employment Website and 2015 Best 
                                                             
4 One could argue that the implementation of IT-enabled monitoring tool induces changes in both the supply and 
demand sides. We employ the two following ways to validate the causal relationship between the observed result and 
the change in employer surplus. First, we create a new price premium measure with the minimum of bid prices as the 
baseline to take the potential change in the supply side into consideration. Second, we conduct a falsification test by 
taking the employer surplus evaluated at the average bid price as the dependent variable in the DID model. If the 
result regarding a lower price premium and a higher employer surplus is caused by the supply side, we expect that the 
falsification test should fail. On the whole, both the new price premium measure and falsification test support our 
hypotheses. 
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Professional Services Website5. In Freelancer, the employer can pose his/her project description, project 
budget and skills required. By showing the budget of the whole project, the employer indicates that this 
project adopts a fixed-price contract. If the unit of the project budget is dollars per hour, it implies that 
the employer will make a time and materials contract and then the contractor will get paid for his or her 
hourly work. 
Typically, a project will open for bidding for a week and any contractor who is interested can bid to win 
the project. For fixed price projects, the bidders need to post their expected payment and state how long it 
would take him to fulfill the project; and for hourly projects, the bidders need to post their expected 
hourly rate. Before the bidding period expires, the employer can review bidders’ basic information, such 
as their nationality, skills, self-introduction, average hourly wage, etc. Moreover, Freelancer also provides 
bidders’ previous project experience and their former employers’ ratings and comments. Just like the 
traditional hiring process, if the employer is interested in some candidates among all the bidders, he/she 
could chat with them before hiring. Additionally, some filtering tools are also available and enable an 
employer to sort bidders according to the number of reviews, average rating, etc. Once the employer finds 
the candidate who satisfies him/her the most and meets his/her minimum requirements, he or she could 
award that contractor and send out more detailed instructions. We obtained an archived sample dataset 
from Freelancer including the project information and user information from Aug 1st, 2014 to July 1st, 
2016. We follow Lin et al. (2016) to construct our sample. For example, we limited our sample to awarded 
projects that reflect realistic labor demand without the contamination of resubmitted projects. Further, 
we matched fixed-price and hourly projects (Ho et al. 2007) based on distributions of important 
covariates suggested by the previous literature using propensity score matching (PSM). Our final sample 
includes 17,827 fixed-price projects and 8,563 hourly projects. The descriptive information of our dataset 
is shown in Table 1 and Table 2. 
The dataset includes the following attributes: 1) project-level information (i.e. project description, project 
budget, type of contracts, number of bidders and average bid price, who was awarded and so on); 2) user-
level information (i.e. ratings, the amount of reviews, nationality, average hourly wage, etc.).  
 
Table 1 Definitions and Summary Statistics of Related Variables 
Variable Variable definition Mean Sd Min Max 
Num_Bid 
Total number of bids received by the 
project 
13.22 16.87 1 196 
Budget_Min 
The minimum budget set by the 
employer 
93.46 933.14 2 75000 
Budget_Max 
The maximum budget set by the 
employer 
262.34 2181.88 2 150000 
Employer_Developed 
A dummy variable(0,1), =1 if the 
employer comes from a developed 
country 
0.73 0.45 0 1 
Project_title_length 
Number of characters in the project 
title 
5.18 3.12 1 43 
Desc Length The length of project description 87.14 86.88 6 2222 
Num_Employerreview 
Total number of reviews received by 
employers 
47.07 107.54 0 1686 
Employer_Rating 
Average rating score received by the 
employer 
4.91 0.44 0 5 
NDA 
A dummy variable(0,1), =1 if the 
employer and the bidder have assigned 
a NDA contract to protect the 
employer's right 
0 0.06 0 1 
Featured 
A dummy variable(0,1), =1 if the 
project is a featured project 
0.01 0.08 0 1 
                                                             
5 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freelancer.com 
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Nonpublic 
A dummy variable(0,1), =1 if the 
project is an non-public project 
0.01 0.11 0 1 
Fulltime 
A dummy variable(0,1), =1 if the 
project is an fulltime project 
0 0.01 0 1 
Language_en 
A dummy variable(0,1), =1 if the 
project is described in English 
0.96 0.2 0 1 
Currency_us 
A dummy variable(0,1), =1 if the 
project budget is measured in dollars 
(the currency of US) 
0.78 0.42 0 1 
 
Table 2. Definitions and Summary Statistics of User-level Variables 
Variable Variable definition Mean SD Min Max 
User_hourly_rate  Hourly rate set by the contractor 7.95 22.70 0.00 1500.00 
User_avg_rating  Average overall employer-entered 
ratings for the contractor 
7.56 4.04 0.00 10.00 
User_earnings   An earnings proxy provided by 
Freelancer, which increases as projects 
are completed and paid by the employer 
in Freelancer 
0.08 0.48 0.00 8.84 
User_tenure_month  Contractor's tenure at Freelancer 
measured in months 
34.67 30.91 1.00 201.00 
User_belong_company  A dummy variable(0,1), =1 if the 
contractor was hired by a company 
before 
0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00 
User_developed  A dummy variable(0,1), =1 if the 
contractor comes from a developed 
country 
0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Quality Average quality rating given by all the 
employers (ranging from 0 to 5) 
4.81 0.54 1.00 5.00 
Communication Average communication rating given by 
all the employers (ranging from 0 to 5) 
4.82 0.55 0.00 5.00 
Expertise Average expertise rating given by all the 
employers (ranging from 0 to 5) 
4.80 0.55 0.00 5.00 
Professionalism Average professionalism rating given by 
all the employers (ranging from 0 to 5) 
4.83 0.55 0.00 5.00 
Hire-again rating Average hire-again rating given by all 
the employers (ranging from 0 to 5) 
4.81 0.58 0.00 5.00 
Completion_rate  Percentage of awarded projects which 
were successfully completed 
0.87 0.21 0.02 1.00 
Overall Average overall employer-entered 
ratings for the contractor 
4.81 0.52 1.00 5.00 
Review_count Total number of reviews which were 
written by previous employers 
12.40 50.51 1.00 3853.00 
Milestone_percentage   
 
A special feature at Freelancer, which 
increases as projects are completed, the 
controlled payments have been received 
by the contractors  at Freelancer 
73.28 40.70 0.00 120.00 
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Identification: A Quasi-Natural Experiment 
As mentioned before, the information asymmetry problem has been a serious issue, especially for hourly 
projects. Because the risk allocation of an hourly project is mainly on the principal (the employer), the 
tradeoff between monitoring costs and the uncertainty or risk of outcome always troubles the employer 
(Mani et al. 2012). On August 2nd, 2015, Freelancer released an enhanced tracking feature to help alleviate 
the monitoring problem. Such an IT artifact serves as a control tool with the potential to allow employers 
to effortlessly monitor the freelancers. This monitoring system randomly takes screenshots every ten 
minutes, and tracks the amount of minutes the contractor has been spent. Therefore, it can confidently 
keep a record of the project process even with an unstable Internet connection, sparing the employers’ 
efforts to keep checking the project process. Considering the spatial and temporal separations between the 
employer and contractor, such a monitoring system makes it more convenient for the employer to prevent 
the contractor from shirking and to track the project progress by reducing monitoring costs. The employer 
could file a dispute regarding the quality of the contractor’s work based on the offline tracking logs. 
Additionally, after the monitoring tool was released, the tool is mandatory for all the contractors who are 
awarded hourly projects. Taken together, this monitoring system alleviates the concerns about losing 
track of the progress for hourly projects and effectively lowers monitoring costs. So it might better serve 
the interests of the employers of hourly projects, because there are higher ex-post monitoring costs and 
risk in hourly contracts (Bajari and Tadelis 2001; Dey et al. 2010; Susarla et al. 2009; Susarla and 
Krishnan 2014) and such risk is mainly allocated on employers. More importantly, since the monitoring 
system is mandatory for hourly contractors, it’s reasonable to assume that the employers may adjust their 
hiring preference accordingly. Therefore, given the more essential need for effective monitoring tools and 
the higher likelihood of a strategic adjustment for the employers of hourly projects, the monitoring system 
should have a stronger effect on hourly projects than fixed-price projects. Here, we consider fixed-price 
projects as the control group and examine the effect of the IT-enabled monitoring system on hourly 
projects.  
Empirical Model and Results 
Measures and Models 
Linear Probability Model 
To estimate employer preference for contractors in terms of their observable characteristics, we formulate a model to 
compare each contractor’s winning probability within each project. Specifically, we estimate the probability of one 
bidder being awarded as Pr (𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗=1).  Denote 𝑈𝑖𝑗  for the employer’s utility from hiring bidder j for project i. 
𝑈𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝐵𝑗 + 𝛾𝑃𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗                (1) 
where  𝑋𝑖𝑗 denotes a set of project-bidder paired characteristics, such as the price premium of each bid. 𝑃𝑖  
indicates a set of time-invariant project characteristics, such as project budget, the length of description, 
etc. 𝐵𝑗  means the bidders’ related characteristics, such as bidders’ employer-entered ratings, whether he 
or she is from a developed country and so on6. 𝜀𝑖𝑗  is a random error. Based on our aforementioned 
theoretical background, we extended the latent utility model as follows. This model could be estimated 
with a linear probability model (Greenwood and Agarwal 2015; Heckman and Snyder 1997) or a logit 
model (Lin et al. 2016; Liu et al. 2015). Given our interest in interpreting the interaction effects, we opt to 




                (2) 
𝑈𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑗 × 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 × 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦 + 𝛽𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗 × 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 × 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦 
+𝛾𝑃𝑖 + 𝛿𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗                      (3) 
                                                             
6 Based on our review data, the average rating of each contractor is almost constant during our observational period. 
Therefore, we didn’t treat the contractor rating as a time-variant variable here.  
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where 𝛼 is a 4X1 matrix of coefficient estimates and each row is corresponding to one of the following four 
groups: 1) 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 = 0, 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦 = 0 ; 2) 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 = 1, 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦 = 0 ; 3) 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 = 0, 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦 = 1 ; 4) 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 =
1, 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦 = 1. Since there exist high linear correlations between the bidders’ employer-entered ratings of 
different dimensions, we employed the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to reduce the dimensions 
and generated two components representing four kinds of employer-entered ratings for bidders, including 
1) PC1: Quality of Contractor; 2) PC2: Effort at Work 7 . Therefore, 𝛽  is a 42 matrix of coefficient 
estimates. Each of row represents the coefficient estimates of four components for each group. 
DID Models 
In order to test Hypothesis 2b, we create a relative employer surplus measure Employer_Surplus, which 
measures the relative percentage of employer surplus with respect to the maximum of the project budget. 
Here, the employer surplus means the gap between the maximum of project budget and the final awarded 
bid price.  If the price is just equal to the employer’s Willingness To Pay (WTP), that is, the maximum of 
the budget, he or she is indifferent between hiring and not hiring and the employer surplus will be zero. 
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑟_𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖 =
(𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒_𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖 −  𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑_𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖)
𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒_𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖
⁄         (4)8 
Based on this data set and our research design, we estimated the treatment effect based on the Difference-
in-Difference (DID) model (Bertrand et al. 2002): 
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑟_𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 × 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝜀  (5) 
𝑁𝑢𝑚_𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑠𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 × 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝜀  (6) 
In the model, the dependent variable is the total number of bids for each project i, 𝑁𝑢𝑚_𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑠𝑖.  𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 is 
the dummy variable indicating whether the project is posted after August 2nd, 20159. The contract type is 
indicated by 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦𝑖 , which equals to 1 if the project is an hourly project and 0 if it employs fixed-price 
contract. The interaction term between 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 and 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦𝑖  (𝛽3) thus identifies the heterogeneous effect of 
the availability of the IT-enabled monitoring system on fixed-price projects and hourly ones. To control 
for the heterogeneity of projects, we also added other project characteristics and employer characteristics 
(𝑣𝑖 ) into the DID model and 𝜀 denotes the error term. 
Empirical Result  
Employer Preference and Surplus 
Based on the result of the Linear Probability model, we find that before and after the IT-enabled 
monitoring system was implemented, for Quality_of_contractor, the coefficients remain unchanged at 
remains at 0.002 (p<0.001), indicating employers’ preference towards this dimension of reputation does 
not change. Interestingly, we observe a different pattern regarding the coefficients for the other 
dimension of reputation: Effort_at_work. As Table 3 shows, for fixed-price projects, the employer 
preference shows minor increase (from 0.009 to 0.012), however, for hourly projects, the employer 
                                                             
7 Quality of work, communication, expertise, professionalism, would hire again rating items are mainly loaded on the 
Quality of Contractor component. Additionally, the completion rate item is mainly loaded on the Effort at Work 
component. 
8 Based on the summary statistics of our sample, there are 35.35% projects whose awarded prices are equal to the 
maximums of budgets. Hence, we believe that the maximum of project budget is a reasonable proxy for employer’s 
Willingness To Pay (WTP). Moreover, since the maximum of the project budget is usually higher than the maximums 
of bid price in our sample, employer surplus with respect to the maximums of budget actually is a more conservative 
measure than the surplus with respect to the maximums of bids.   
9 The IT-enabled monitoring system has been introduced since August 2nd, 2015. Since this monitoring system is 
imperative for all the hourly contractors and usually there is a time lag between project submission date and award 
date, we consider the “After” of those projects posted after August 2nd is equal to 1. We also tried to label “After” as 1 if 
the projects were posted after September 1st, the result is still highly consistent. Our conclusions remain robust if we 
adopt different time dummies. 
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preference shows a relatively large decrease (from 0.013 to 0.008), indicating employers show 
substantially less preference for high reputation contractors regarding the Effert_at_work dimension. 
Further, we also check how bid price affects employers before and after the implementation of the 
monitoring system. Interestingly, we found although employers are less price-sensitive for fixed-price 
projects (maybe due to temporal effects), they became more price sensitive for hourly projects. We also 
retested Hypothesis 1 with the Conditional Logit model, and the results are qualitatively the same. 
Table 3 Estimation Results of the Linear Probability Model 
Variable Sub-group Project_awarded 
Quality_of_contractor 
Fixed_price, Before   0.002***(0.000) 
Fixed_price, After   0.002***(0.001) 
Hourly, Before   0.002***(0.000) 
Hourly, After   0.002***(0.001) 
Effort_at_work 
Fixed_price, Before   0.009***(0.001) 
Fixed_price, After   0.012***(0.001) 
Hourly, Before   0.013***(0.002) 
Hourly, After   0.008***(0.002) 
Price_premium 
 
Fixed_price, Before –0.007***(0.001) 
Fixed_price, After –0.003***(0.001) 
Hourly, Before –0.002**  (0.001) 
Hourly, After –0.005***(0.001) 
Log_b_count_rating   0.008***(0.001) 
User_developed   0.027***(0.003) 
Log_milestone_percentage –0.009***(0.001) 
User_belong_company   0.005***(0.001) 
Log_bidder_tenure_month –0.004***(0.001) 
Log_bidder_rank –0.012***(0.001) 
Log_bid_order_rank   0.016***(0.001) 
Log_b_hourly_rate –0.006***(0.001) 
Intercept   0.125***(0.007) 
N  161,994 
Clusters(projects)   25,380 
R-square within   0.022 
R-square between   0.651 
Notes: a. Price premium is defined as Price_premium = (Bid_amount –Bid_min )/Bid_min. b. We limit 
our sample to those projects which are awarded to only one contractor. Therefore, our sample in the 
fixed-effect model only includes 26,390-582=25,808 projects. c. The result is based on all the contractors 
who bided for both the fixed-price and hourly projects (named as “dual-typed contractors”) (Lin et al. 
2016). Those projects whose winners all bided for one type of projects were dropped from our sample. 
Therefore, our final sample includes 25,808-428=25,380 projects. d. Results of dummy variables 
denoting contractor characteristics (whether the contractor gets a special Preferred Freelancer Badge, 
etc.) are suppressed for brevity. e. User_count_rating denotes the number of ratings in projects with 
similar skills. This number is provided by the Freelancer website to help employers to evaluate different 
bidders’ experience in relevant skills. f. Bidder_rank means the bidder’s ranking among all the candidates. 
Freelancer automatically sorts all the bidders according to its own ranking algorithm which is mainly 
based bidders’ employer-entered reviews. g. Bid_order_rank denotes the sequence in which the bidders’ 
bids were submitted. h. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; g. p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01. 
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In line with the change in employer preference, based on the marginal effect of the interaction term at the 
mean values of all the covariates, the price premiums paid by employers of hourly projects decline 30.1%. 
Additionally, we also find that the interaction term in the Equation (5) is significantly positive, which 
suggests that on average employers enjoy more surplus in hourly projects than before. Based on the 
marginal effect of DID model at the mean values, on average, the implementation of monitoring systems 
(the treatment) increases the employer surplus by 21.5%, which lends support to Hypothesis H2b.  On the 
whole, results of the DID models lend support to Hypothesis 2a and Hypothesis 2b.  
 
Table 4 Differences-in-Differences Estimations of the Impact of the IT-
enabled Monitoring System on Employer Surplus  
Dependent Variable Price_premium Employer_surplus 
Hourly –0.333***(0.028)   0.277***(0.012) 
After   0.112***(0.031) –0.017*    (0.009) 
Hourly *After –0.241***(0.043)   0.031**  (0.015) 
Log_paid_amount   0.166***(0.012) –0.127***(0.005) 
Log_bid_count   0.355***(0.012)   0.048***(0.004) 
Log_budget_max –0.140***(0.015)   0.193***(0.006) 
Language_en   0.023      (0.035)   0.004      (0.015) 
Log_title_length –0.025      (0.017)   0.012*    (0.007) 
Log_preview_desc_length –0.006      (0.014)   0.012**  (0.006) 
Log_employer_overall_rating –0.004      (0.011)   0.006      (0.004) 
Log_employer_reviews_count   0.025***(0.007) –0.012***(0.003) 
Log_employer_tenure_month –0.019      (0.017)   0.007      (0.006) 
Employer_developed –0.082***(0.024)   0.031***(0.009) 
Intercept   0.090      (0.077) –0.364***(0.030) 
N   26,390   26,390 
Adj R-squared   0.120   0.160 
Notes: a. Dummy variables for various project categories, such as software, design, marketing, data-entry, 
are included. The results of these dummies are suppressed for brevity; b. Results of dummy variables 
denoting project characteristics (whether a NDA contract is included, whether the project is featured or 
sealed, whether the project is a fulltime job, whether the currency is dollar, whether the project is written 
in English) are suppressed for brevity; c. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; d. * p<0.1, 
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Bidding Behavior 
According to the result of DID model, we found that the coefficient of After (𝛽1) is positive, which means 
that there are more contractors bidding for fixed-price projects than before. This increase in Num_Bids 
might result from multiple reasons, such as the popularity of Freelancer, etc. Taking this into 
consideration, the interaction term (𝛽3) is still significantly positive, which suggests that after the IT-
enabled monitoring system was available, the increase in Num_Bids of hourly projects is larger than that 
of fixed-price projects. This is consistent with our hypothesis that a more homogenous service market will 
attract more contractors. The finding that the interaction term is 0.160 implies that the number of bids 
increases 17.4%10. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is also supported. 
Overall, our results of the Conditional Logit model and the DID models support all of our hypotheses.  
                                                             
10 Based on the estimation results in Table 5, before the implementation of monitoring systems, the partial correlation 
between Hourly dummy and Log_ Num_Bids is -0.023. This partial coefficient becomes 0.137 after the 
implementation. Since the dependent variable takes the log transformation, we transform the change in the 
coefficient with the exponential function to obtain the actual increase in the number of bids. Exp(0.160) - 1=17.4%. 
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Table 5 Differences-in-Differences Estimations of the 
Impact of the IT-enabled Monitoring System on Num_Bids 
Dependent Variable Log_ Num_Bids 
After 0.088*** (0.021) 
Hourly –0.023       (0.023) 
Hourly * After 0.160*** (0.032) 
Log_paid_amount –0.026*** (0.007) 
Log_budget_max 0.155*** (0.009) 
Language_en 0.291*** (0.030) 
Log_title_length 0.118*** (0.014) 
Log_preview_desc_length 0.326*** (0.013) 
Intercept –1.233*** (0.068) 
N       26,390 
Adj R-squared  0.460 
Notes: a. Dummy variables for various project categories, such as software, design, marketing, data-entry, 
are included. The results of these dummies are suppressed for brevity; b. Results of dummy variables 
denoting project characteristics (whether a NDA contract is included, whether the project is featured or 
sealed, whether the project is a fulltime job, whether the currency is dollar, whether the project is written 
in English) are suppressed for brevity; c. Dummy variables for employers’ characteristics (the average 
rating, number of reviews, employer tenure measured in months, whether the employer is from a 
developed country) are suppressed for brevity; d. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; d. * 
p<0.1  ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. 
Robustness Check 
To further validate our hypotheses, we performed several robustness checks. First, we tried to balance the 
distribution across the treatment and control group with multiple matching methods, and then retested 
our results with the matched sample. Second, we used an alternative measure of price premiums and 
reran the DID model. We also tested if employer preference for actual bid prices had changed. Third, we 
also conducted a falsification check in order to rule out the alternative explanation that the change in 
awarded bid prices came from lower average bid prices rather than the change of employer preference. 
Alternative Matching Methods  
In order to balance the distribution of observed characteristics across the treatment and control group, we 
tried to conduct the Propensity Score Matching and retested the hypotheses with the matched sample. 
Specifically, we included employers’ reputation (employer ratings given by awarded contractors, the 
number of reviews the employers receive), whether the employer is from a developed country, the number 
of characters in project description (Lin et al. 2016), project type dummies, the month dummies as the 
pretreatment covariates to match the hourly projects and fixed-price projects. We estimated the 
coefficient of the interaction term in the DID model with the use of the One-to-one Matching, Radius 
Matching, Kernel Matching. All the results are consistent with our main results.  
Table 6 Estimates of ATT in the Matched Sample 
Matching algorithms Price_premium Employer_surplus Log_Num_bids 
One-to-one Matching, with 
replacement 
–0.229***(0.053) 0.037** (0.017) 0.098***(0.034) 
Radius Matching,  caliper(0.10) –0.135***(0.028) 0.028** (0.012) 0.130***(0.023) 
Kernel Matching, caliper(0.10) –0.137***(0.028) 0.028** (0.012) 0.126***(0.023) 
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Alternative Measurements 
In order to retest the Hypothesis 2b, we created an alternative measure of awarded bid prices, 
Award_BidPrice, which is the ratio of the bid price of the awarded contractor to the maximum of the 
project budget. If the awarded bid price is just equal to the employer’s willingness-to-pay (WTP), that is, 
the maximum of the budget, he or she is indifferent between hiring and not hiring and Award_BidPrice 
will be equal to one. In such case, the employer surplus will be zero. In the main result section, we showed 
that, after the IT-enabled monitoring system was available, employer surplus of hourly projects is higher 
than it was before. So when we took 𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑_𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐 as the dependent variable, we still expected 
that the interaction term in DID model would be negative. And the result of this robustness check is also 




        (7) 
In the main result, we included Price_Premium, a standardized price measurement, in the model to test 
Hypothesis 1. To further check our argument, we also built the model including the actual bid prices (log-
transformed) and tested if the result is still consistent. The estimates of the Linear Probability Model 
including the actual bid prices (log-transformed) suggests that after the monitoring system was available, 
employers were more sensitive to Bid_Price and no longer put substantial weights on Effort_at_work 
component of bidders’ employer-entered ratings as before. Hence, the result is consistent with our main 
results.  
Falsification Checks and an Alternative Explanation 
Even though we found that the employer surplus of hourly projects is higher than it was before, it is 
possible that this is driven by factors other than employer preference. An alternative explanation is that 
contractors require lower hourly salaries than they did before. In order to rule out this alternative 
explanation, we tested if the coefficient of the interaction term in the DID model is still significant by 
taking the employer surplus evaluated at the average bid price as a dependent variable. According to the 
estimates of the DID model, after the IT-enabled monitoring system was available, the increase in the 
employer surplus of hourly projects with respect to the average bid prices is not significantly higher than 
that of fixed-price projects. However, the incremental employer surplus of hourly projects with respect to 
awarded bid prices is significantly higher than that of the control group (fixed-price projects), which 
implies that such a change in employer surplus is mainly because of employers’ less willingness to pay 
price premiums, rather than the lower bid prices. Additionally, in order to validate our argument that the 
introduction of IT-enabled monitoring system facilitates the market competition by lowering the entry 
barrier, we also employ a DID model to estimate the impact of the IT-enabled monitoring system on the 
percentage of contractors (Perc_norating) who haven’t accumulated any reputation records from 
employers (Lin et al. 2016). Our result suggests that after the IT-enabled monitoring system was 
introduced, Perc_norating of hourly projects is significantly lower than before. Specifically, based on the 
result of marginal effect estimates, it (Perc_norating) increases 9.1% after the implementation of 
monitoring systems. On the whole, the fact that there is relatively more participation of inexperienced 
contractors in hourly projects supports our argument that IT-enabled monitoring system facilitates 
market competition by lowering entry barrier. 
Discussion 
Key Findings and Implications 
In this research, we show the evidence that the introduction of IT-enabled monitoring systems can lower 
the employers’ preference for contractors with high-reputation, increase employer surplus and facilitate 
market competition. Our estimation results are based on a quasi-natural experiment design with fixed-
price projects as the control group and hourly projects as the treatment group. The results of our DID 
models and the Linear Probability Model suggest that after the monitoring system was introduced, 
employers are less willing to pay the premiums for the high reputation in Effort at Work, and thus enjoy a 
higher surplus. This finding implies that there exists a partial substitution relationship between the 
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monitoring system and the reputation system. Moreover, our results also show that the introduction of 
IT-enabled monitoring systems facilitates competition by attracting more inexperienced contractors to 
bid for the projects.  
Additionally, our study also contributes to several strands in the online labor market literature. First, our 
study is the first large-scale empirical research to examine the effect of IT-enabled monitoring systems on 
both the demand and supply side of an online labor market. Unlike the previous literature mainly 
examining the effect of monitoring system within a firm (Gopal and Koka 2010) or one location(Pierce et 
al. 2015), our large dataset can be leveraged to test the influence of the monitoring system on the whole 
online labor market within a certain platform. Such an advantage enables us to identify the ripple effect of 
the IT-enabled monitoring system on the market structure. Second, our study extends previous research 
on the effect of reputation systems in digital platforms. According to the previous literature on reputation 
systems, reputation acts as a signal of contractors’ future performance (Banker and Hwang 2008), and 
motivates contractors to spend more effort (Horton and Golden 2015). However, our results suggest that 
its effect can be partially substituted by the IT-enabled monitoring system, which alleviates moral hazard 
by efficiently providing more precise information about contractors’ effort (Agrawal et al. 2014; Pierce et 
al. 2015). This implies that future research on reputation systems should also take the availability of 
monitoring systems as a critical contingency factor. Third, this research suggests that the impact of IT-
enabled monitoring systems is not limited to mitigating moral hazard problems and improving agents’ 
productivity (Duflo et al. 2012).  In this study, we show that the IT-enabled monitoring systems can help 
to reduce agency costs, raise employer surplus, and facilitate market competition. Therefore, our finding 
implies that IT artifacts can have a prominent effect on the market structure. 
Our study has several important implications. First, this study has implications for the stream of online 
labor market literature by exploiting a quasi-experiment methodology. Different from the previous 
literature using the Heckman selection model to address the endogeneity problems (Gopal and Koka 
2010), we employ a quasi-experiment and investigate the effect of IT-enabled monitoring system on both 
the demand and supply sides. The DID model doesn’t only have the advantage of controlling for self-
selection bias, but also well address the time-series heterogeneity issue (Xue et al. 2011). Therefore, our 
quasi-natural experiment approach allows us to provide a full picture of the impact of IT-enabled 
monitoring system on both the demand and supply sides. Second, our research provides some managerial 
implications to the platform design of online labor markets. There is a large body of research suggesting 
that the reputation system helps to mitigate moral hazard by acting as both a stimulus for high effort 
(Horton and Golden 2015) and a sanctioning mechanism (Dellarocas 2006). Meanwhile, the monitoring 
system is also found to be highly effective in improving agents’ performance (Duflo et al. 2012). However, 
our study suggests that there exists a partial substitution relationship between these mechanisms. Hence, 
our study deepens our understanding of the optimal design of online labor markets (Hong et al. 2015) by 
emphasizing the potential interaction effect between the reputation systems and monitoring systems. 
Finally, our study suggests that monitoring systems lower the entry barrier for inexperienced contractors 
and help to address the “cold-start” problem at online labor markets (Pallais 2014), which provides 
valuable practical implications. 
Limitations and Further Research 
We acknowledge a number of limitations of this research, which opens up avenues for future research. 
First, we note that complete data on the actual employer monitoring behavior is not available. However, 
considering there might be only part of the employers adopting the IT-enabled monitoring system, our 
estimated effect of the IT-enabled monitoring system tend to be conservative. Second, due to data 
limitations, our research only tested the effect of the IT-enabled monitoring system on the hourly contract 
market by using the observational data from only one particular crowdsourcing platform. Even though 
our platform is one of the largest crowdsourcing platforms all over the world, the effect of monitoring 
systems might still vary as the usefulness and ease-of-use of monitoring systems or platform 
characteristics change. Further research should retest our hypotheses under the context of other 
platforms or other monitoring systems. Finally, we only focused on testing the effect of IT-enabled 
monitoring system on the employer preference and contractors’ bidding behaviors. Future research could 
collect the reviews and ratings data corresponding to these awarded projects in order to explore the effect 
of the IT-enabled monitoring system on the project final performance. 
 IT-enabled Monitoring Systems in Online Labor Markets 
  
 Thirty Seventh International Conference on Information Systems, Dublin 2016 16 
References 
Agrawal, A., Horton, J., Lacetera, N., and Lyons, E. 2013. "Digitization and the contract labor market: A 
research agenda," National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Agrawal, A., Lacetera, N., and Lyons, E. 2014. "Does Standardized Information in Online Markets 
Disproportionately Benefit Job Applicants from Less Developed Countries?,". 
Allgulin, M., and Ellingsen, T. 2002. "Monitoring and pay," Journal of Labor Economics (20:2), pp 201-
216. 
Bajari, P., and Tadelis, S. 2001. "Incentives versus transaction costs: A theory of procurement contracts," 
RAND Journal of Economics (32:3), pp. 387-407. 
Banerjee A V, Duflo E. 2000. "Reputation effects and the limits of contracting: A study of the Indian 
software industry", The Quarterly Journal of Economics (115:3), pp. 989-1017.  
Banker, R.D. and Hwang, I. (2008) "Importance of Measures of Past Performance: Empirical Evidence on 
Quality of e‐Service Providers," Contemporary Accounting Research (25:2), pp. 307-337. 
Bertrand, M., Duflo, E., and Mullainathan, S. 2002. "How much should we trust differences-in-
differences estimates?," National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Bresnahan, Timothy F., Erik Brynjolfsson, and Lorin M. Hitt. 2002. "Pchnology, Organization, and the 
Demand for Skilled Labor." The new relationship: Human capital in the American corporation, 
pp.145. 
Chen, Y., and Bharadwaj, A. 2009. "An empirical analysis of contract structures in IT outsourcing," 
Information Systems Research (20:4), pp. 484-506. 
Clemons, E. K., and Chen, Y. 2011. "Making the decision to contract for cloud services: managing the risk 
of an extreme form of IT outsourcing," System Sciences (HICSS), the 44th Hawaii International 
Conference on, IEEE2011, pp. 1-10. 
Dellarocas, C. 2006. "Reputation mechanisms". Handbook on Economics and Information Systems,pp. 
629-660. 
Demiroglu, C., and James, C. M. 2010. "The role of private equity group reputation in LBO financing," 
Journal of Financial Economics (96:2), pp. 306-330. 
Dewan, Sanjeev, and Fei Ren. 2011. "Information technology and firm boundaries: Impact on firm risk 
and return performance." Information Systems Research (22:2), pp.369-388. 
Dey, D., Fan, M., and Zhang, C. 2010. "Design and analysis of contracts for software outsourcing," 
Information Systems Research (21:1), pp. 93-114. 
Diamond, Douglas W.1989. "Reputation acquisition in debt markets." The Journal of Political Economy 
(97:4), pp. 828-862. 
Diamond, D. W. 1991. "Monitoring and reputation: The choice between bank loans and directly placed 
debt," Journal of political Economy (99:4), pp. 689-721. 
Drago, R. 1991. "Incentives, pay, and performance: a study of Australian employees," Applied Economics 
(23:9), pp. 1433-1446. 
Duflo, E., Hanna, R., and Ryan, S. P. 2012. "Incentives work: Getting teachers to come to school," The 
American Economic Review (102:4), pp. 1241-1278. 
Eisenhardt, K. M. 1989. "Agency theory: An assessment and review," Academy of management review 
(14:1), pp. 57-74. 
Esfahani, H. S. 1991. "Reputation and uncertainty Toward an explanation of quality problems in 
competitive LDC markets," Journal of Development Economics (35:1), pp. 1-32. 
Ewing, B. T., and Payne, J. E. 1999. "The trade-off between supervision and wages: evidence of efficiency 
wages from the NLSY," Southern Economic Journal (66:2), pp. 424-432. 
Fama, E. F. 1991. "Time, salary, and incentive payoffs in labor contracts," Journal of Labor Economics 
(9:1), pp. 25-44. 
Fombrun, C. 1996. Reputation, Wiley Online Library. 
Gefen, D., Wyss, S., and Lichtenstein, Y. 2008. "Business familiarity as risk mitigation in software 
development outsourcing contracts," MIS Quarterly (32:3), pp. 531-551. 
Greenwood, B.N. and Agarwal, R. (2015) "Matching platforms and HIV incidence: An empirical 
investigation of race, gender, and socioeconomic status," Management Science (62:8), pp.2281 - 2303. 
Goes, P., and Lin, M. 2012. "Does Information Really'Unravel'? Understanding Factors That Motivate 
Sellers to Seek Third-Party Certifications in an Online Labor Market," Understanding Factors That 
 IT-enabled Monitoring Systems in Online Labor Markets 
  
 Thirty Seventh International Conference on Information Systems, Dublin 2016 17 
Motivate Sellers to Seek Third-Party Certifications in an Online Labor Market (November 1, 2012) 
.NET Institute Working Paper:12-02. 
Gopal, A., and Sivaramakrishnan, K. 2008. "Research Note-On Vendor Preferences for Contract Types in 
Offshore Software Projects: The Case of Fixed Price vs. Time and Materials Contracts," Information 
Systems Research (19:2), pp. 202-220. 
Gopal, A., and Koka, B. 2010. "The role of contracts on quality and returns to quality in offshore software 
development outsourcing." Decision Sciences, (41:3), pp. 491-516.  
Heckman, J. J., & Snyder Jr, J. M. (1997). "Linear probability models of the demand for attributes with an 
empirical application to estimating the preferences of legislators". RAND Journal of Economics. 
S142-S189. 
Hitt, L. 1999. "Information technology and firm boundaries: Evidence from panel data." Information 
Systems Research (10:2), pp.134-149. 
Ho, D. E., Imai, K., King, G. and Stuart, E. A. 2007. "Matching as nonparametric preprocessing for 
reducing model dependence in parametric causal inference," Political Analysis. (15:3), pp.199-236. 
Hong, Y. and Pavlou, P. A., 2014. “Is the World Truly 'Flat'? Empirical Evidence from Online Labor 
Markets,” Empirical Evidence from Online Labor Markets. Fox School of Business Research Paper, 
(15-045). 
Hong, Y., Wang, C. and Pavlou, P. A. 2016. "Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Evidence from 
Online Labor Markets." Information Systems Research (27:1), pp.49-69. 
Horton, J. J. 2015. "Supply Constraints as a Market Friction: Evidence from an Online Labor Market."   
Horton, J. J., and Golden, J. M. 2015. "Reputation Inflation: Evidence from an Online Labor Market."  
Hubbard, T. N. 2000. "The demand for monitoring technologies: the case of trucking," Quarterly Journal 
of Economics (115:2), pp. 533-560. 
Lin, M., Liu, Y., and Viswanathan, S. 2016. "Effectiveness of Reputation in Contracting for Customized 
Production: Evidence from Online Labor Markets," Management Science (forthcoming). 
Liu, De, et al. 2015. "Friendships in online peer-to-peer lending: Pipes, prisms, and relational herding," 
Mis Quarterly (39:3), pp. 729-742. 
Jin, G. Z., and Kato, A. 2006. "Price, quality, and reputation: Evidence from an online field experiment," 
The RAND Journal of Economics (37:4), pp. 983-1005. 
Kanat, I., Hong, Y. and Raghu, T. S. 2015. "Surviving and Thriving in the Online Labor Markets: A 
Geoeconomic Analysis." Available at SSRN 2701471. 
Kokkodis, M., and Ipeirotis, P. G. 2015. "Reputation Transferability in Online Labor Markets," 
Management Science (62:6), pp.1687-1706. 
Leonard, J. S. 1987. "Carrots and sticks: Pay, supervision and turnover," National Bureau of Economic 
Research Cambridge, Mass., USA. 
Mani, D., Barua, A., and Whinston, A. B. 2012. "An empirical analysis of the contractual and information 
structures of business process outsourcing relationships," Information Systems Research (23:3-part-
1), pp. 618-634. 
Xue, M., Hitt, L. and Chen, P. 2010. "Determinants and outcomes of internet banking adoption." 
Management science (57:2), pp. 291-307. 
Moreno, A., and Terwiesch, C. 2014. "Doing business with strangers: Reputation in online service 
marketplaces," Information Systems Research (25:4), pp. 865-886. 
Pallais, A. 2013. "Inefficient hiring in entry-level labor markets," The American Economic Review 
(104:11), pp. 3565-3599. 
Pierce, L., Snow, D. C., and McAfee, A. 2015. "Cleaning house: The impact of information technology 
monitoring on employee theft and productivity," Management Science (61:10), pp 2299-2319. 
Roels, G., Karmarkar, U. S., and Carr, S. 2010. "Contracting for collaborative services," Management 
Science (56:5), pp. 849-863. 
Shapiro, C., and Stiglitz, J. E. 1984. "Equilibrium unemployment as a worker discipline device," The 
American Economic Review (74:3), pp. 433-444. 
Srivastava, S. C., and Teo, T. S. 2012. "Contract performance in offshore systems development: Role of 
control mechanisms," Journal of Management Information Systems (29:1), pp. 115-158. 
Susarla, A., Barua, A., and Whinston, A. B. 2009. "A transaction cost perspective of the" Software as a 
Service" business model," Journal of Management Information Systems (26:2), pp. 205-240. 
Susarla, A., and Krishnan, R. 2014. "Contracting in the Shadow of the Future," Available at SSRN 
1975215. 
 IT-enabled Monitoring Systems in Online Labor Markets 
  
 Thirty Seventh International Conference on Information Systems, Dublin 2016 18 
Zheng, A., Hong, Y. and Pavlou, P., 2015. Value Uncertainty and Buyer Contracting: Evidence from Online 
Labor Markets. Proceedings of the International Conference on Information Systems, Dallas, TX. 
